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Donald Trump stands out from other postwar US presidents. He is the first modern president to
enter office with neither political nor military experience. His speeches are laced with
braggadocio, he openly denounces the media, pointedly refused to accept the results of the
election before it took place, and continued to allege voter fraud without evidence, even after
winning the 2016 presidential election. Yet one of the most important ways in which Trump
differs from most postwar presidents is his employment of explicitly racist rhetoric and policies
targeting immigrants and non-whites.1 Political scientists need to understand the reasons racist
rhetoric is proving successful in the United States and the European Union.2
Trump used overtly racist framing throughout his political career: he launched his
presidential campaign calling large numbers of Mexicans rapists and murderers; his policy
proposals included a wall between the United States and Mexico, mass deportation of
undocumented immigrants and a ban on Muslims entering the United States; he declared an
Indiana-born judge unfit to judge him because of his Mexican heritage; he equivocated about
disavowing an endorsement by former KKK grand wizard David Duke, he circulates internet

I do not mean to suggest that Trump is the first American politician to appeal to voters on a basis of race, merely
that his rhetoric and policy proposals stand out in their overt embrace of racism.
2 It can be a challenge to demarcate what populism is. Right-wing populism can be distinguished from left-leaning
varieties in its attempt to use the language of popular sovereignty to limit minority rights. The call for “illiberal
democracy” by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán would be a prototypical example. Many contemporary
populist movements avoid xenophobia. The Five-star movement in Italy, Podemos in Spain, Syriza in Greece, and
the Bernie Sanders campaign in the United States might be thought of as examples of left-leaning populism. Some
democratic theorists continue to believe that populism remains an essential element of democracy, for instance see:
Laura Grattan, Populism’s Power: Radical Grassroots Democracy in America (New York, NY: Oxford University
Press, 2016).
1

memes infused with symbols and bogus statistics familiar to white nationalist groups; and he
insists that African-Americans live in crime-ridden inner cities.3 In office, President Trump has
largely adhered to an anti-immigration agenda – constrained only by the limits of presidential
power. On January 27th, 2017, with little prior warning, he signed an executive order banning
travel from seven predominantly Muslim countries. Thousands of people – including green card
holders, refugees, and even some that had aided American troops during the Iraq war – were held
in detention in airports, or were informed that their visas had been provisionally revoked. 4
Although nation-wide protests and subsequent legal challenges overturned elements of the travel
ban5, some of its provisions remain in effect. Additionally, the Trump administration encouraged
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials to redouble efforts to round up
undocumented immigrants; while the pardon of Joe Arpaio, a sheriff convicted of violating a
court order to halt racial profiling of Latinos, sends the message that law enforcement need not
fear repercussions of overreach. Trump’s presidency may also be inspiring mobilization by hate
groups. Five days after the election, the Southern Poverty Law Center reported a large spike in

See, for instance: Michelle Lee, “Donald Trump’s False Comments Connecting Mexican Immigrants and Crime,”
Washington Post July 8, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/08/donald-trumpsfalse-comments-connecting-mexican-immigrants-and-crime. Brent Kendall, “Trump Says Judge’s Mexican Heritage
Presents ‘Absolute Conflict,’” Wall Street Journal June 3, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-keepsup-attacks-on-judge-gonzalo-curiel-1464911442. Glen Kessler, “Donald Trump and David Duke: For the Record,”
Washington Post March 1, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/03/01/donald-trumpand-david-duke-for-the-record/. J. M Berger, “How White Nationalists Learned to Love Donald Trump,” Politico
October 25, 2016, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/10/donald-trump-2016-white-nationalists-alt-right214388. Nick Gass, “Trump defends telling black voters ‘what do you have to lose?,’’ Politico September 21, 2016,
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/trump-what-have-you-got-to-lose-228462.
4 Justin Jouvenal, Rachel Weiner, and Ann Marimow, “Justice Dept. Lawyer Says 100,000 Visas Revoked Under
Travel Ban; State Dept. Says About 60,000,” February 3, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/publicsafety/government-reveals-over-100000-visas-revoked-due-to-travel-ban/2017/02/03/7d529eec-ea2c-11e6-b82f687d6e6a3e7c_story.html?utm_term=.036e390e5731.
5 The Courts used Trump’s own language from the campaign trail as evidence that the executive order was
conceived with an explicitly discriminatory intent.
3

attacks on minorities.6 President Trump also uses the bully pulpit to provide covering fire for
white nationalists. After a white nationalist protestor in Charlottesville, Virginia drove a car into
a crowd of counter-protestors, killing 1 and injuring 19, President Trump criticized violence “on
both sides,” drawing equivalency between those sporting Neo-Nazi or Confederate symbols and
those protesting against them. 7
Understanding the role of racist appeals in Trump’s victory is important for political
scientists. Right-wing populism is not merely an American phenomenon – far-right parties have
become increasingly successful in recent years. In 2014, Viktor Orbán, Hungarian Prime
Minister since 2010, gave a speech outlining a vision of “illiberal democracy” – democracy
lacking such elements as the protection of minority rights. Since 2014, many politicians
representing distinct flavors of illiberal democracy have moved from the fringes of power to
being serious contenders for national office. On May 9th, 2016, Filipino voters elected Rodrigo
Duterte as President. Since his election, Duterte encouraged police to kill suspected drug
traffickers, drug users, and even human rights activists, pardoning officers in cases of legal
challenges. Human Rights Watch estimates that Filipino police have killed at least 7,000 people
since the election. 8 On June 23rd, 2016, British voters voted to leave the European Union
following a “Brexit” referendum campaign characterized by frequent attacks on immigrants and
Muslims. In France, the Netherlands, Greece, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Austria, far-right

Southern Poverty Law Center, “Update: More Than 400 Incidents of Hateful Harassment and Intimidation Since
the Election,” Southern Poverty Law Center November 15, 2016,
https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2016/11/15/update-more-400-incidents-hateful-harassment-and-intimidationelection.
7 Reuters, “Trump, Again, Casts Blame on Both Sides for Deadly Violence in Virginia,” New York Times August 15,
2017.
8 Human Rights Watch, “Philippines: Duterte Threatens Human Rights Community,” Human Rights Watch August
17, 2017 https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/17/philippines-duterte-threatens-human-rights-community.
6

parties are now significant contenders for power. 9 All of this is enough to make one wonder
whether we are in the throes of a moment like that described by Karl Polanyi, where aggressive
counter-movements against globalization shatter democratic institutions around the world. 10
Understanding why voters favored Trump over Clinton, but also over other Republicans,
is important for predicting which elements of Trump’s political coalition are likely to endure,
and influence policy. A venerable tradition in American politics examines the impact of
“realigning elections” where shifts in the political coalitions underlying parties foster long-term
change. 11 If indeed Trump has created a fundamentally new Republican party, the impact might
last for decades. In contrast, it is possible that the coalition around Trumpism and perhaps other
illiberal democrats is an ephemeral one, prone to fracture.
In this article, I focus on the question of whether and how Trump’s political base differs
from that of other Republicans. Many Trump voters indicated they had an “unfavorable” view of
Trump, suggesting divergence within the Republican coalition.12 Perhaps evangelical
conservatives voted for Trump to ensure the appointment of conservative Supreme Court
justices, while others perhaps acted out of partisan loyalty to the Republican Party. It is
important to understand not only those voters that supported Trump enthusiastically, but also
those who voted for Trump reluctantly, because those voters occupy the center-ground of
American politics. I consider four broad arguments about what drove Trump’s success. Some

Respectively, the far-right parties are: the Front National in France, Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, the
Golden Dawn in Greece, the True Finns in Finland, the Democrats in Sweden, the Danish People’s Party in
Denmark, and the Freedom Party in Austria.
10 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Times, (Boston, MA:
Beacon Press, 2001).
11 Bensel, Richard, Sectionalism and American Political Development (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press,
1987).
12 CNN, “Exit Polls,” CNN 2016, http://www.cnn.com/election/results/exit-polls/.
9

accounts argue that Trump was able to appeal to economically anxious voters struggling from the
ravages of the 2008 financial crisis, globalization or rural decline. In this account, the appeal of
racist rhetoric could be secondary to voter behavior. Others believe that the politics of race was
important to Trump’s victory. Perhaps Donald Trump’s base resembles the Republican Party’s
long-standing “southern strategy” coalition between free market conservatives and voters with
racial resentment towards African-Americans. If true, Trump may not differ so much from other
Republicans. Alternatively, Trump’s success might depend upon rallying voters that identify
strongly with whiteness. It is useful to look at which factors best predicted Trump support,
particularly during the 2016 primary, when Republicans were split between numerous
contenders.
Drawing from the American National Election Study (ANES) pilot data13, I argue that
Trump’s racist rhetoric was central to his political success. However, I do not find evidence that
Trump support relied on strong attachments to white or American identity.14 Rather, Trump was
able to appeal to a diverse coalition of voters with different racial anxieties. Although most
Republican candidates attracted favorable views among voters with resentment toward AfricanAmericans, Trump also drew admiration from voters with diverse anxieties about MuslimAmericans and Hispanic-Americans. I contend that the prominent presidential campaigns of two
Hispanic-Americans (Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio), Republican efforts to appeal to minority
voters following their 2012 defeat, and the rhetoric of Donald Trump may have heightened the
fears of xenophobic voters. Trumpism (ca. January, 2016 when the ANES pilot was conducted)

American National Election Studies, American National Election Study: 2016 Pilot Study (Ann Arbor, MI: InterUniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research, 2016),
http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/anes_pilot_2016/anes_pilot_2016.htm.
14 See John Sides, Michael Tesler and Lynn Vavreck, Identity Crisis: The 2016 Campaign and the Battle for the
Meaning of America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018).
13

was a quilt, stitching together voters with different racial anxieties. It is possible that coalescence
around common media organs like Breitbart, and agenda-setting powers of the presidency may
yet fuse the constituent parts of Trump’s electoral coalition into a cohesive white nationalist
voting bloc.
This article proceeds as follows. First, I discuss three hypotheses about Trumpism,
developing analytical narratives for each story about whether they fit Trump’s rise. I challenge
the view that Trump’s rise is a response to economic anxiety, noting that he does not draw
particularly strong support from lower-income voters. Next, I explore the idea that Trump is
similar to other Republicans, continuing a long tradition of dog-whistle racism. Drawing on the
2016 ANES pilot study, I present some evidence that, although all Republicans drew support
from racially anxious individuals, those favorable to Trump had different racial anxieties from
those preferring other Republicans. I also examine the idea that Trumpism flows from
ethnocentrism or white nationalism. Here again, the stylized facts do not support the claim –
Trump’s support among voters with strong identification with the white race, or an American
ethnocultural identity, was not particularly high. Moreover, hostile attitudes toward outgroups
are diverse, and do not overlap in the way an ethnocentrism story would suggest. Lastly, I
introduce my own interpretation – that Trumpism is a quilt of different voters drawn by different
racial frames. I test this proposition by examining the relative favorability of ANES respondents
toward Donald Trump and other Republicans. I find that fears of a Latino President and the
belief that Muslims are violent substantially differentiated Trump supporters from supporters of
other Republican primary contenders.

Trumpism as Economic Anxiety

In 2008, I sat on a bus in Indianapolis, reading an economics textbook. A man sitting next to me
asked how I felt about globalization. Following my “on the one hand…” answer, he cut to the
chase, telling me that he “hates Chinese and Indian people” because they stole his job. Eager to
clarify that he was not racist he added “but I’ve got no problem with the blacks, they gave us
rock’n’roll.” The idea that voters suffering from economic hardship might be attracted to racist
rhetoric is an intuitively appealing one. We know voters respond negatively to adverse economic
conditions, and the political economy of trade literature has long emphasized such connections.
Many works discuss the link between economic forces and backlash politics.15 Modeling
the international impact of globalization on incomes across different income percentiles,
Milanovic finds that globalization looks like an elephant. The global middle class (for example,
Chinese and Indian workers) and the richest 1% have seen enormous gains from 1988-2008, the
poorest countries were shut out of the global system, while the global upper middle class
(working class people in developed countries) fared poorly. The ravages of the financial crisis
may have exacerbated the pain of long-simmering challenges. David Autor et al, in turn,
emphasize trade more specifically, positing that exposure to Chinese imports was strongly

Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1986). Kenneth Scheve and Matthew Slaughter. 2007. “A New Deal for Globalization,”
Foreign Affairs 84: 4 (2007), pp. 1-33. Jeff Guo. “Stop Blaming Racism for Donald Trump’s Rise,” The Washington
Post August 19, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/08/19/stop-blaming-racism-fordonald-trumps-rise/. Branko Milanovic, Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).
15

predictive of Trump support at the county level, although they do not offer other controls. 16
Alternately, when Shannon Monnat examined the correlates of Trump support at the county
level, she found that counties suffering above-average deaths of despair often swung from
Obama to Trump. In her telling, economic distress is filtered through a politics of place – voters
in struggling communities become more pessimistic, and more susceptible to ideologies like
Trumpism.17 Economic explanations are appealing because they can explain the simultaneous
eruption of backlash coalitions across many countries. Moreover, if voters are responding to
economic anxiety, the policy solution is clear – we can combat far-right discontent with
measures that reduce income inequality and protect voters from the vagaries of economic
globalization. John Lilla makes a corollary point, arguing that an overemphasis on “identity
politics” is hurting the Democratic Party.18
However, there are some serious problems with an economic anxiety explanation of
Trumpism’s appeal. First, although Trump fared better than past Republicans among low-income
voters, exit polls showed he lost voters earning under $50,000 by 11 points.19 Philip Klinkner’s
statistical analysis of the ANES pilot data found that family income had no predictive impact on
respondent preferences for Trump over Clinton, nor did economic anxiety (after controlling for
respondent approval of President Barack Obama). 20 Second, if voters were responding to
economic uncertainty or stagnant wages, it is surprising that so few Hispanic and AfricanAmerican voters backed Trump in the Republican primary and subsequent election. Finally,

David Autor, David Dorn, Gordon Hanson and Kaveh Majlesi, “A Note on the Effect of Rising Trade Exposure
on the 2016 Presidential Election,” Working Paper (2016), http://www.ddorn.net/papers/ADHM-President2016.pdf.
17 Shannon Monnat, “Deaths of Despair and Support for Trump in the 2016 Presidential Election,” Research Brief,
http://aese.psu.edu/directory/smm67/Election16.pdf.
18 For instance, see: Mark Lilla, The Once and Future Liberal (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2017).
19 CNN. “Exit Polls,” CNN 2016, http://www.cnn.com/election/results/exit-polls.
20 Philip Klinkner, “The Easiest Way to Guess if Someone Supports Trump? Ask if Obama is a Muslim,” Vox June
2, 2016, http://www.vox.com/2016/6/2/11833548/donald-trump-support-race-religion-economy.
16

there may be reasons to question the implicit argument underlying the “economic anxiety” claim
– that redistributive programs could act as a palliative against racial resentments. Katherine
Cramer conducted extensive interviews with rural Wisconsinites, a group vital to Trump’s
victory in the 2016 election.21 The voters she talked to interpreted the world through the lens of
their rural community. They were often resistant to broad-based income redistribution schemes,
believing the bulk of federal largesse would go to more politically influential urban residents. 22
Voter beliefs about economic issues are often embedded in, and inseparable from the
identifications that shape their perceptions of political reality.

Trumpism as the Southern Strategy

Donald Trump’s racial rhetoric might be seen as the culmination of a long-standing trend in
American politics. In 1964, Republican presidential candidate, Barry Goldwater, ran in
opposition to the Civil Rights Act. Although Goldwater lost to Lyndon Johnson in a landslide,
his victory in the “solid south” signaled the potential for a new coalition. In 1968, Alabama
Governor George Wallace, famous for standing in a schoolhouse door to deny entry to black
children, ran for President as an independent, winning some southern states and 14% of the vote.
Since 1968, Republican political candidates employed a “southern strategy,” using dog-whistle
language to simultaneously appeal to racially resentful working class voters, while enacting anti-

Katherine Cramer, The Politics of Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2016).
22 The maintenance of a two-tier welfare state, with some programs (like Medicare) framed as entitlements, and
others (like food stamps) framed as “welfare” could further notions that the welfare state merely serves others.
21

poor policies.23 When Richard Nixon invoked the need for “law and order,” or referred to his
constituency as “the silent majority,” racially-conscious voters knew what he was talking about.
Similarly, when Ronald Reagan spun stories of avaricious “welfare queens,” he could appeal to
racist voters without using overtly racist language. Even Democrats have made symbolic
gestures to diminish their disadvantage among white Southerners. As a Presidential candidate,
Bill Clinton campaigned for welfare reform, reprimanded Jesse Jackson’s Rainbow Coalition for
inviting a controversial rap artist, Sistah Souljah, to speak at a function, and returned to Arkansas
during the campaign to preside over the execution of a mentally incapacitated African-American
man convicted of killing a police officer. 24
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the targets of dog-whistling broadened, with MuslimAmericans portrayed as dangerous and Hispanic-Americans as illegal immigrants. 25 The
election of an African-American president, Barack Obama, in 2008 may have exacerbated
sorting among white voters, decisively shifting racially resentful voters to the Republican Party.
Newly installed as President, Obama pushed for a stimulus package, prompting significant
resistance from the Republican “Tea Party”. Launching into a rant on the floor of the Chicago
Board of Trade, CNBC commentator, Rick Santelli, decried a government policy that gave
mortgage bailouts to “losers”. Given that greater shares of underwater mortgages were held by
minorities 26, bailouts were a heavily racialized issue. Republican opposition to President Obama,

Ian Haney Lopez, Dog Whistle Politics: How Coded Racial Appeals Have Reinvented Racism and Wrecked the
Middle Class (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015).
24 Linda Williams, The Constraint of Race: Legacies of White Skin Privilege in America (University Park, PA:
Pennsylvania University Press, 2003). Joe Soss, Richard Fording, and Sanford Schram, Disciplining the Poor:
Neoliberal Paternalism and the Persistent Power of Race (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2011).
25 Ian Haney Lopez, Dog Whistle Politics: How Coded Racial Appeals Have Reinvented Racism and Wrecked the
Middle Class (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015).
26 Facing discrimination in mortgage markets, minorities were more likely to rely on subprime loans even
controlling for income levels according to Richard Williams, Reynold Nesiba, and Eileen Diaz McConnell, “The
Changing Face of Inequality in Home Mortgage Lending,” Social Problems 52: 2 (2005), pp. 181-208.
23

in the form of the Tea Party, and the presidential campaign of Mitt Romney, frequently
employed a dichotomy between “makers” and “takers”. When Romney decried the 47% of
Americans that did not pay income taxes, he continued this long tradition.
Donald Trump might be characterized as a Southern Strategist trading in his dog-whistle
for a megaphone. If true, Trump may not differ from other Republicans. Philip Klinkner
analyzed the ANES data, examining which factors best predicted the gap in respondent’s relative
preference for Trump over Clinton.27 He found convincingly that racial resentment toward
African-Americans was a strong predictor of respondent’s relative preference for Trump over
Clinton. A swing from the lowest to the highest levels of racial resentment, while controlling for
other factors, predicted nearly a 30-point swing in relative preference toward Trump.
At the same time, racial resentment toward African-Americans may not uniquely explain
Donald Trump’s rise within the Republican Party. I was curious about the degree to which racial
resentment might also predict favorability for other Republicans, relative to Hillary Clinton.
Replicating Klinkner’s model (although I used tobit regression), I found that racial resentment
toward African-Americans was strongly predictive of favorability for all Republicans relative to
Clinton, with the exception of Jeb Bush (see Figure 1).28 Trump was unique in his ability to
appeal to voters with racial animus other than resentment toward Black Americans. For instance,
a belief that Muslims were violent yielded substantially greater favorability to Trump (and, to a
lesser degree, Jeb Bush), but little to other Republican primary candidates. Although Trumpism
relies on elements of racial appeals borrowed from the past, it is also something new.

Specifically, Klinkner used data from a 0 to 100 feeling thermometer for Trump and Clinton, subtracting the latter
form the former.
28 The variables and methods employed are discussed later. The sample in question included all white ANES 2016
pilot study respondents.
27

Figure 1: Gain in Relative Preference for Five Republicans vs. Hillary Clinton Following Shift
from Bottom 5th Percentile to Top 5th Percentile of Resentment Scale and Belief that Muslims are
Violent

Trumpism as White Nationalism

Trumpism may have succeeded by speaking to and reinforcing an imagined community around
whiteness. Hostile attitudes to outgroups, then, cannot be understood without considering the
role of white nationalism in defining the interests and identities of in-group members. Three
different traditions emphasizing different mechanisms behind identity formation are of particular
relevance. First, the “authoritarian personality” personality argument emphasizes psychological
mechanisms behind hostility to outsiders. Seeking to explain the appeal of fascism in Nazi
Germany, T. W. Adorno et. al argued that certain individuals exhibit an “authoritarian

personality,” entailing a strong attachment to their own ethnic group, distaste for others, and a
preference for strong leaders.29 In times of perceived threat, authoritarians are especially prone to
accept strong leaders, and outgroup denunciation. The theory initially received considerable
criticism around sample bias and measurement issues; however, more recent works may have
corrected some of these flaws. One study of Trump support used attitudes toward parenting to
gauge “authoritarianism,” indeed finding that those favoring strong discipline were more likely
to support Trump.30
A number of other studies into the correlates of far-right support in Europe argue that
hostility to minorities starts with strong ties to ethno-cultural ingroups.31 For instance, Paul
Sniderman argues that ‘prejudice is blind’ – voters exhibiting racial prejudices toward one
outgroup often express hostility to other outgroups as well.32 One limitation of Sniderman’s work
is his focus on European cases, where all outgroups were immigrants, and not long-standing
citizens. Kinder and Kam used ANES data to examine xenophobic attitudes among Americans.
They find a strong link between voters with an “American” identity, and prejudiced beliefs
toward all out-groups.33 They conclude that racist or xenophobic voters do not begin with

TW Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality
(Oxford, UK: Harpers, 1950).
30 MacWilliams, Matthew, “Who Decides When the Party Doesn’t? Authoritarian Voters and the Rise of Donald
Trump,” PS: Political Science 49(4): pp. 716-721.
31 Paul Sniderman, Louk Hagendoorn, and Markus Prior, “Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers:
Exclusionary Reactions to Immigrant Minorities,” American Political Science Review 98: 1 (2004), pp. 35-49.
Paul Sniderman, and Louk Hagendoorn, When Ways of Life Collide: Multiculturalism and its Discontents in the
Netherlands (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).
32 Another possible explanation for overlapping prejudices might lie in the connection between views of “the other”
and pathogen sensitivity. For instance, Horner and Rule explore the restrictionist presentation of immigrants as
sources of “contagion,” at times literally (for example, immigrants suffering from HIV are often subject to
additional restrictions and attacks) or morally. Jed Horner, and John Rule, “The Politics of Space and the
Spacialisation of Politics: New Directions for Examining the Connections Between Immigration and Contagion,”
New Political Science 35: 3 (2013), pp. 463-478. Another forthcoming paper finds evidence that anti-immigrant
views are best predicted by pathogen sensitivity: Lene Arøe, Michael Petersen, and Kevin Arceneaux, “The
Behavioral Immune System Shapes Political Intuitions,” American Political Science Review (forthcoming).
33 Donald Kinder, and Cindy Kam, Us Against Them: Ethnocentric Foundations of American Opinion (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 2009).
29

outgroup hostility, but rather, have their politics framed by ethnocentrism. During times of
threat, ethnocentric voters exhibit hostility to all outgroups.
One of the limits of ethnocentrism studies is that they treat identity groupings as
exogenous. Nancy Love’s Trendy Fascism, and the symposium on it featured in New Political
Science, overcomes this limitation by looking at the emergence of white supremacy as a global,
transnational movement. Nancy Love examines how white power music crafts an imagined
community, pushing white working class individuals to view their challenges in racial terms.34
Love argues that liberalism fails to address white supremacy, first because liberal policies
generate and disempower a precariat through a form of “inverted totalitarianism,” and secondly
because liberalism’s insistence on rational discourse ignores the power of aesthetic arguments.
Many of the former white supremacists interviewed by Love describe how white power music’s
expression of white decline twinned their precarious circumstances with an emotional call to
action. Noting the successful conversion of white supremacists, Love notes the importance of
empathy and exemplars, rather than rational persuasion. Some caution should be exercised,
however, there may be limits in applicability of these exceptional cases to a larger white public
that professes color-blindness while endorsing policies that attack non-white and immigrant
communities.35 Moreover, music may not be the only forum where these ideas are given voice,
and there may be room to challenge far-right narratives with factual reality.36 Consider, for
instance, the intersections between medical pseudoscience and the far-right. Alex Jones, the host

See Nancy Love, Trendy Fascism: White Power Music and the Future of Democracy (Albany, NY: SUNY Press,
2016) and Nancy Love, “Singing Alone is Not Enough: A Response to Reviewers,” New Political Science, 39(2):
pp. 295-297.
35 Bruce Baum, “Music to Their Ears: Nancy Love’s Trendy Fascism, White Nationalism, and the Future of
Whiteness,” New Political Science, 39(2): pp. 269-277.
36 María Pía Lara, “On Trendy Fascism,” New Political Science, 39(2): pp. 283-288.
34

of Infowars, can move breathlessly between denunciations of “mass-migration” to hawking
supplements that will restore purity, and avert the physical decline of his customers.
Some aspects of Trump’s candidacy might seem to support the idea that part of his
success lies in an appeal to white nationalism. 37 One reporter described the development of
Trump’s long courtship of extreme nationalists by reading discussions of Trump on websites like
Stormfront, a prominent far-right message board. While Trump’s repudiation of Obama’s birth
certificate in 2011 put him on the radar of far-right posters, many remained skeptical, believing
he was a “secret Jew”. By retweeting images and Twitter accounts familiar to White Nationalists,
and refusing to disavow the endorsement of former KKK grand wizard David Duke, skepticism
turned to acceptance and admiration. 38 And some studies have found identification with
whiteness to be strongly predictive of Trump support in the general election. 39
Yet, there are also two key reasons to doubt that Trump’s capture of the Republican Party
hinged exclusively on white nationalism.40 Consider the ANES pilot data on racial and ethnic
identity. White respondents favorable to Trump were not much more likely to say that their racial
identity was extremely or very important than respondents favorable to other candidates (see
Figure 2). A similar pattern holds up if one swaps racial identification for attachment to an
American identity. Voters favorable to Trump are barely distinguishable from other Republicans
in terms of their attachment to American identity.

In contrast with most other post-9/11 Republicans, Trump frequently avoids the rhetoric of American
exceptionalism and nationalism.
38 J. M Berger, “How White Nationalists Learned to Love Donald Trump,” Politico October 25, 2016,
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/10/donald-trump-2016-white-nationalists-alt-right-214388
39 See John Sides, Michael Tesler and Lynn Vavreck, Identity Crisis: The 2016 Campaign and the Battle for the
Meaning of America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018).
40 Whether President Trump and his staff espouse white nationalist views is a separate question – the aim here is
simply to examine what drove his support.
37

Figure 2: Percentage of White ANES Respondents Favorable to Each Candidate Indicating that
Their Racial Identity is Very or Extremely Important to Them

Figure 3: Percentage of ANES Respondents Favorable to Each Candidate Indicating that
American Identity is Very or Extremely Important to Them

Second, if Trump has tapped into fearful white nationalist voters, we should expect
considerable overlap between frames expressing different racial anxieties. Yet, there is not much

evidence of clusters of “all-of-the-above” racists the white nationalism hypothesis would expect.
While racial prejudices exhibit some correlation, racial frames do not always overlap. Figure 4
depicts the distribution of white ANES respondents with anti-black attitudes (appearing in the
most resentful 25% of a racial resentment index 41), anti-Muslim attitudes (a belief that Muslims
were violent), and anti-Hispanic attitudes (a belief that a Latino president would enact policies
favoring immigrants or a belief that a Latino president would favor Latin America42). While
many white respondents (68.5%) endorsed at least one hostile racial frame, there is no particular
clustering of racial animus among all-of-the-above racism.
Figure 4: Distribution of Hostile Frames Toward Minority Groups Among White ANES
Respondents

Respondents were considered more resentful if they agreed with statements that “Irish, Italians, Jewish and many
other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special
favors,” and “It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could
be just as well off as whites.” Disagreement with statements that “Generations of slavery and discrimination have
created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class,” and “Over the past few
years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve,” was also considered more resentful.
42 ANES respondents were asked different questions about favoritism from a Latino president.
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Trumpism as a Quilt

In a multicultural society, voters may have opinions about members of many other groups, each
varying in salience, explicitness, and complexity. Many Americans harbor implicit or explicit
prejudices about some groups, are indifferent about other groups, and possess affinity to others.
Nancy Love’s call to investigate aesthetics as political discourse is a good one – much of the
literature suggests that racially resentful voters can be activated by particular frames. Branton et.
al examined the 2000 and 2004 ANES data and found that the attitudes of non-Hispanic white
Americans toward immigration changed, as the American news-media emphasized Latino
immigration.43 Hopkins ran a similar experiment to see how people would react to a news video
featuring a Latino speaking accented English relative to one speaking unaccented English. 44
Survey participants exposed to the latter exhibited more positive views toward immigration than
those viewing accented English. Numerous analyses of the outcome of the 2016 general election
find evidence that racist (and sexist) attitudes were powerful predictors of Trump support, but
more needs to be done to explore the role of distinct racist appeals.45

R. Branton, EC Cassese, and BS Jones, “All Along the Watchtower: Acculturation fear, anti-Latino affect, and
immigration,” Journal of Politics 73: 3 (2011), pp. 664-679.
44 D J. Hopkins, “The Upside of Accents: Language, Skin Tone, and Attitudes Toward Immigration.” British
Journal of Political Science 45: 3 (2015), pp. 531-557.
45 See, for instance, John Sides, Michael Tesler, and Lynn Vavreck, “How Trump Lost and Won,” Journal of
Democracy 28(2): pp. 34-44; Brian Schaffner, Matthew MacWilliams, and Tatishe Nteta, “Understanding White
Polarization in the 2016 Vote for President: The Sobering Role of Racism and Sexism,” Political Science Quarterly,
forthcoming.
43

Racist politicians may rise up, not by appealing to well-formed group identities, but by
forging a quilt of different resentments, each activated by the right frame. John Hultgren’s
exploration of the history of how historical American immigration restriction campaigns
appealed to environmentalist frames is an even more dramatic example of how diverse antiimmigration frames might even draw in ostensibly progressive individuals.46 Alternately, Pim
Fortuyn rose from the fringes of Dutch politics by attacking Muslims as being out of synch with
tolerant Dutch values.
Applying the quilt model, it might be possible to understand American political parties as
ever-shifting coalitions, defined by their triangulations. For instance, despite the racist character
of the “Southern Strategy,” Republicans were able to win support from some minority groups.
For decades, strong opposition to Communism, and the Castro regime in Cuba, won Republicans
support among Cuban-American voters. Prior to 9/11, Republicans may have been competitive
among Muslim-American voters. 47 In the 1992 and 1996 elections, exit polls showed
Republicans winning a plurality of the Asian-American vote – even while losing both elections.48
As recently as 2004, President Bush may have won 44% of the vote among HispanicAmericans.49
Donald Trump won the 2016 Republican Primary by employing a consistently effective
formula. He adopted threatening language and tied threats to outgroups, particularly MexicanAmericans and Muslims. Trump also loudly advocated for policies that targeted these out-

John Hultgren, “The “Nature” of American Immigration Restrictionism,” New Political Science 36: 1 (2014), pp.
52-75.
47 Alexander Rose, “How did Muslims Vote in 2000?” Middle East Quarterly 8: 3 (2001), pp. 13-27.
48 Admittedly, exit polls should be taken with a grain of salt. Not only do they have small sample sizes, they may
also exhibit sampling bias. For historical exit polls, see: Roper Center, “How Groups Voted,” Roper Center for
Public Opinion Research http://ropercenter.cornell.edu/polls/us-elections/how-groups-voted/.
49 CNN, “Exit Polls,” CNN 2004, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/states/US/P/00/epolls.0.html.
46

groups, including the construction of a border wall, mass-deportation, and a ban on Muslim entry
into the United States. Although other candidates endorsed some of these policies, Trump’s
stance on these issues was less ambiguous. In the 2016 primary, Trump effectively exploited
racial anxieties about terrorist attacks and the long-term loss of political power for white
Americans. This kitchen sink approach was successful, not because of clearly expressed white
nationalism, but rather, because of widespread indifference to the harms of repressive policies on
others. Protected by a chorus of “I’m not a racist, but…” voters could support Trump’s
denunciation of groups they were hostile to, while discounting his attacks on others. Thus,
Republican voters stuck with Trump through the general election campaign.
During the November 10, 2015 Fox Business debate, Republican Senator Ted Cruz was
asked a question about undocumented immigration. His answer is instructive about how he saw
his own political liabilities in a racially charged Republican primary. Cruz argued that “the
politics of it [illegal immigration] would be very, very different if a bunch of lawyers or bankers
were coming across the Rio Grande, or if a bunch of people with journalism degrees were
coming over and driving down wages in the press.”50 Later, as Election Day loomed in New
Hampshire, Cruz ran ads depicting mostly white, upper middle class professionals crossing the
Rio Grande wearing suits. In another debate in January, Cruz derided Trump’s “New York
values” without explaining the meaning of the term. Cruz was desperate to recast the primary
along the lines of class or region. As a Cuban-American in a party whose racialized fears of
undocumented immigration had been intensified by Donald Trump, Cruz wanted voters to think
about race as little as possible.

New Republic, “Ted Cruz: Invasion,” New Republic Campaign Ad Archive January 5, 2016,
https://newrepublic.com/political-ad-database/ted-cruz-invasion/MS81LzE2OkludmFzaW9u.
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Yet, in many respects the very candidacy of Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio was part of the
animus driving voters to Trump. In the aftermath of the 2012 Republican defeat, Democracy
Corps51 conducted three focus groups consisting of Tea Party supporters, Evangelicals, and
moderate Republicans. The conversation in the former two groups soon drifted toward the idea
that the Democratic Party was creating a permanent majority by encouraging immigration and
buying the votes of immigrants with government handouts. Many media accounts following the
election, and the stated strategy of the Republican Party, seemed to agree, pushing the idea that
demographic change doomed Republicans. The effects of this messaging should have been
predictable. Studies of anti-immigrant or racist attitudes consistently find that voters
overestimate the proportion of people from outgroups, and that higher estimates correspond with
deeper animosity to immigration and integration. 52 Even subtle cues, such as hearing a Spanish
conversation on a train can heighten hostility.53 The prominent candidacy of Jeb Bush,54 whose
wife Columba is from Mexico, and two Cuban-Americans, Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio, may
have amplified the very fears percolating through much of the Republican base.

Democracy Corps is run by James Carville, a Democratic Party strategist. Nonetheless, it is striking how closely
the talking points found among “Tea Party” and “Evangelical” participants resembles increasingly common
discourses about immigration in the United States. Democracy Corps, “Inside the GOP: Report on Focus Groups
with Evangelical, Tea Party and Moderate Republicans,” Democracy Corps October 3, 2013,
http://www.democracycorps.com/Republican-Party-Project/inside-the-gop-report-on-focus-groups-with-evangelicaltea-party-and-moderate-republicans/.
52 The effects of an actual increase in immigration are less clear. Sides and Citrin found that friendship with
immigrants predicted less support for anti-immigrant politicians. Hainmueller and Hopkins, in turn, summarize
conflicting findings about the impact of contact with immigrants in the American political context, with effects
hinging on whether individuals expect to encounter outgroup members or not, and whether contact is personal or
not. John Sides and Jack Citrin, “European Opinion About Immigration: The Role of Identities, Interests and
Information,” British Journal of Political Science 37: 3 (2007), pp. 477-504. Jens Hainmueller and Daniel Hopkins,
“Public Attitudes toward Immigration,” Annual Reviews of Political Science 17 (2014), pp. 225-249.
51

Ryan Enos, “Causal Effect of Intergroup Contact on Exclusionary Attitudes,” Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 111:10 (2014), pp. 3699-3704.
54 Jeb Bush had even listed himself as “Hispanic” on a voter form. See: Alan Rappeport, “Bush Marked Himself
“Hispanic” on 2009 Voting Form,” New York Times April 6, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/politics/firstdraft/2015/04/06/jeb-bush-listed-himself-as-hispanic-on-voter-form/.
53

Assessing the Quilt Model

Each of the stories discussed above are empirically testable, using the 2016 ANES January pilot
data.55 Prior to the 2016 primary, prospective voters were asked to rate each candidate on a 0 to
100 feeling thermometer. Subtracting one thermometer from another, it is possible to see which
factors best predicted relative support for one candidate over another. Accordingly, I ran a tobit
model using the feeling thermometer gap between Donald Trump, Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio and
Jeb Bush as my dependent variable. The feelings thermometer gap runs from -100 (strongly
favoring a candidate other than Trump) to 100 (strongly favoring Trump).
Tobit models are designed to examine data that is censored – some distinctions between
answers are unobserved.56 Because my dependent variable (the feelings thermometer gap) runs
from -100 to 100, some distinctions between respondent preferences may be obscured by the
scale. For instance, imagine that both Hillary Clinton and an unsatisfied attendee of Trump
University happened into the ANES sample. Conceivably both might have rated their feelings

Some caution is, doubtless, in order. The ANES pilot study is smaller than the CCES. However, it was conducted
during the 2016 primary, a time when preferences toward Republican primary contenders was relatively highprofile.
56 For background on the appropriateness of Tobit models see Lee Sigelman, and Langche Zeng, “Analyzing
Censored and Sample-selected Models with Tobit and Heckit Models." Political Analysis 8: 2 (1999), pp. 167-182.
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toward Trump as 0, however, if given a scale from -100 to 100, either might give different
ratings.
If the quilt model best predicts favorable sentiments toward Trump, we should expect a
range of different negative attitudes toward minorities, particularly Hispanic-Americans and
Muslim-Americans, to predict a relative preference for Trump. To gauge the power of these
attitudes I included two variables: a belief that a Latino President would favor immigrants,57 and
the belief that Muslims are violent. If Trump support is the result of economic anxiety, we should
expect negative assessments of the economy to be predictive of a favorable attitude toward
Trump. In addition, respondent attitudes toward free trade might be predictive, if in fact,
Trump’s appeal lay in his promise to impose tariffs on other countries. If Trump was primarily
tapping into the voters targeted by the Southern Strategy, we might expect voters with resentful
attitudes toward African-Americans to prefer Donald Trump. Finally, if Trump was successful
by appealing to white nationalism, we might expect racial or cultural identification with ingroups to predict a relative preference for Trump. As a result I included variables measuring
respondent’s identification with their race and with their culture.
In addition to these factors, I controlled for other variables that have historically proven
important in analyses of voting behavior, namely: gender, religiosity, party ID, ideology, family
income, assessments of Obama’s presidency, education, age and assessments of the current state
of the economy. In addition, I included a variable gauging respondent attitude toward legal
immigration, in case it was possible that Trump’s appeal was based on policy preferences rather

The ANES asked different people different questions about a Latino president. Half of respondents were asked if
they felt a Latino President would favor immigrants, the other whether a Latino president would enact policies
favoring Latin America. In my analysis I show the two questions both jointly and separately.
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than outgroup animus. Descriptive statistics for each of these variables are summarized below in
Table 1.
[Table 1 about here]

Results

Observing relative support for Donald Trump against Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, and Jeb Bush,
there is clear evidence that respondents worried about a Latino president favored Trump over the
alternatives (see tables 2-4). In every specification of the model, and in both formulations of the
question (that is, were respondents worried about a Latino president favoring immigrants or
favoring Latin America), the results were statistically significant. A belief that Muslims are
violent was a statistically significant predictor of Trump support in model 1, while resentment
toward African Americans tended to be statistically significant in model 5. Finally, strong
attachment to an American identity was not predictive of positive assessments of Trump. 58 In
fact, in the instances where American identity was statistically significant, Trump fared better
among voters that were less attached to American identity.
[Tables 2-4 about here]
Some economic factors were also predictive of respondent’s relative preference for
Trump, while others were not. Family income was statistically significant in all but the model 5

I have run this model using racial identity instead of American identity. When controlling for hostile frames,
racial identification loses its statistical significance.
58

matchup between Trump and Cruz, suggesting that Trump’s success is probably not the product
of voter reaction to inequality. Economically anxious voters were more likely to rate Trump
positively in some incarnations of the model, although the statistical significance of economic
anxiety varied. Opposition to free trade too, appeared to predict relative preferences for Trump
over Rubio and Bush, but not Ted Cruz. Yet it is not entirely clear that opposition to free trade
flowed directly from individual economic concerns. Other research has found that when voters
are primed to think of cultural threats, they grow more opposed to free trade. 59
It is also useful to take stock of some other variables, many of which have received
considerable attention from the press and from academics. In Model 1, which examined all
respondents, white respondents did not exhibit relative favorability toward Trump over Rubio or
Bush (white voters did favor Trump over Cruz). This result may help explain something that is
undoubtedly part of the story of the 2016 election overall. Non-white and immigrant voters also
have anxieties and resentments toward other racial groups. For instance, some Chinese-language
sites covering the election were critical of Hillary Clinton, tying her to affirmative action policies
targeting Chinese people.60 Women also assessed Trump more negatively than Rubio in Model
1, and assessed Trump more negatively than Jeb Bush across all incarnations of the model.
Despite much discussion of evangelical concerns about Donald Trump, and Ted Cruz’s explicit
appeals to born-again voters, religiosity was not statistically significant in most incarnations of
the model. Ted Cruz did, however, fare substantially better among respondents that were
ideologically conservative. To some extent, this outcome may help explain why so many voters

Yotam Margalit, “Lost in Globalization: International Economic Integration and the Sources of Popular
Discontent,” International Studies Quarterly 56: 3 (2012), pp. 484-500.
60 Ma Tianjie, “Western Liberalism is Dying in China: Why educated Chinese are Embracing Donald Trump’s
Winner-Take-All Worldview,” Foreign Policy November 16, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/16/thepeoples-republic-of-donald-trump-why-educated-chinese-are-spurning-western-liberalism/.
59

ended up voting for Trump in the general election, despite their reservations. “Never Trumpers”
were disproportionately the most conservative voters, and thus highly unlikely to support Clinton
in the general election. Education was not statistically significant in any incarnation of the
model, despite endless media portrayals of Trump’s particular appeal to less educated voters.
Opposition to Obama was not predictive of relative preferences for Trump over Rubio or Cruz,
although respondents that strongly disapproved of Obama were more likely to favor Trump over
Jeb Bush. Finally, for an election in which immigration was a significant issue, surprisingly,
respondent views on legal immigration had no statistical significance, while controlling for the
other frames.
The effect of different variables on a respondent’s relative preference for Trump is also
illuminating. Because I am constrained by space, I focus on Model 1 of the Rubio vs. Trump
model. For each non-binary variable, I illustrate the impact of a swing from the least Trumpfriendly 5% to most Trump-friendly 5%, observed within the data, holding all other variables at
their mean.61 Observing the results, it is clear that fear of a Latino President and the belief that
Muslims are violent were vital to Trump’s victory, representing swings of 21.21 and 10.208
points in the relative feeling thermometer. 62 Opposition to free trade and economic anxiety, too,
appeared to push voters toward Trump, but their collective effects were smaller than hostile
racial frames.

All binary variables were held at 1 (essentially assuming a white male). Although this changes the predicted level
of support for Trump and Rubio, it does not alter the gap between the two.
62 In model 3 (just white respondents), the impact of a swing from least to most worried about a Latino president,
netted Trump 23.586 points. In model 5 (just Republicans), the same swing netted Trump 31.939 points.
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Figure 5: Impact of Swing from the 5th to 95th Percentile of Various Factors on Relative Support
for Trump Over Rubio

Conclusion and Discussion

Fifty years ago, the Caucus for a New Political Science founded New Political Science with a
view that as we study politics, our destinations matter. The symposium on the “roots of resurgent
racism” that this article is part of was conceived with a similar view. At a minimum, far-right
populism threatens the institutions upon which the practice of political science depends. If you
don’t believe me, you have but to look to Hungary, where Victor Orbán is trying to shutter
Central European University. There are times when it is useful for authors to eschew the pretense
of sharing “both sides” of an issue.
What role did Trump’s racist rhetoric play in his 2016 victory in the 2016 Republican
Primary and the 2016 general election, and how might we use those lessons to better construct an
anti-racist politics? Donald Trump’s ability to stoke racial resentments and anxieties played a
large role in allowing him to win the Republican primary. While resentment toward AfricanAmericans was widespread among voters favorable to most Republican candidates, Trump
enjoyed a substantial edge among those fearful of Muslims and those worried about the prospects
of a Latino President. Republican outreach to Hispanic voters sounded threatening to
Republicans fearful of whites becoming a minority. By making a loud appeal to different groups
of racially anxious voters, Trump cobbled together an unbeatable coalition in the Republican
primary. Supporters of other Republican candidates may not have shared the same racial animus
of Trump’s core supporters, but were sufficiently indifferent to Trump’s racism that they still
ended up voting for him. In turn, the backlash to Trump’s racial appeals was likely diminished
by the collective action problem created by targeting many groups at once. Indeed, even some

immigrant voters supported Trump, perhaps sharing some of the hostility he expressed to other
groups, while disbelieving that they were genuinely his targets.
Rather than being the result of too much “identity politics” by the Democratic Party,
Trump’s ability to form a quilt coalition of individuals with diverse prejudices and indifferences
depended on the narrative of colorblindness itself. In the film, Strangers on a Train, the main
characters swap murders, in order to avoid suspicion by the authorities. In the 2016 US
Presidential election, voters with distinct racial anxieties, evangelical conservatives, and probusiness conservatives made a similar pact. The glue keeping the coalition together was not a
shared penchant for white bedsheets, but rather, indifference to the plight of millions of
Americans. Broad-based opprobrium, like labeling Trump supporters “a basket of deplorables”
failed because most voters express (and refrain from) some forms of racial hostility themselves.
Rather than understanding racism as a binary, it is more useful to think of attitudes along a
continuum from hostility to indifference to affinity, sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit and
highly sensitive to framing and intergroup contact.
Although broad-based economic redistribution may be desirable on its own terms, it is
unlikely to defeat Trumpism, which draws heavily on racial anxieties, not economic ones.
Robust welfare states have not prevented the emergence of far-right politics in France, Finland,
Sweden, Denmark or the Netherlands. We need to find ways to develop empathy and common
interests between targeted groups and indifferent voters, while defusing hostile frames. Rather
than thinking about racism as a singular force, it may be useful to think about how to counter
specific racist frames effectively. The organizational muscle necessary to combat resurgent
racism is underdeveloped. When Barry Goldwater ran against the Civil Rights Act in 1964, he
was challenged by a well-organized civil rights movement. Today, prominent civil rights groups

advocating for Muslim-Americans and Hispanic-Americans may be under-resourced. There may
be additional challenges in developing common language that weaves together the aims of
divergent civil rights movements.
As Nancy Love illustrates so well, there is nothing paradoxical about transnational
fascism. Xenophobes, racists, white nationalists, and others are meeting, sharing ideas, and
mobilizing the world over. 4chan, “white power” musicians, and misogynistic “red pill” forums
are dotting the global info-sphere with rabbit-holes leading to a place of pure hatred. Although
the majority of individuals do not identify with white nationalism, more are falling through these
rabbit holes. Transnational white supremacy requires a transnational, pluralistic anti-racism to
combat it. There are no panaceas. We need to find every hateful burrow, discover the tactics,
strategies, coalitions, and frames, and help those falling deeper to escape back to the surface.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics63
Variable
American Identity
Unimportant
Not Worried about
Latino President64
Legal immigration
Free trade
Muslims not violent
Resentment toward
African-Americans
Presidential Job
Approval
Assessment of
Current Economy
Economic Anxiety
Education
Party ID
Ideology
Less Church Attend.
Family Income
Gender
Age
White
Trump vs. Jeb
Trump vs. Cruz
Trump vs. Rubio

Bottom 5%
1 (Extremely
important)
1 (Worried)

Mean
2.141

Top 5%
5 (Not important)

3.516

5 (Not worried)

1 (very good)
1 (support)
1 (Extremely good
descriptor)
-8 (low resentment)

2.899
3.871
3.224

6 (very bad)
7 (oppose)
5 (Not at all)

1.358

8 (high resentment)

1 (approve)

4.207

7 (disapprove)

1 (much better)

3.061

5 (much worse)

4 (less anxious)
1 (lower)
1 (Strong Democrat)
1 (Very Liberal)

9.107
3.337
3.62
3.024

1 (> Once/week)
1
1 (Male)
23
0 (non-white)
-54 (Favor Jeb)
-55 (Favor Cruz)
-57 (Favor Rubio)

4.303
5.825
1.508
48.989
.751
3.646
-.897
-3.548

14 (more anxious)
6 (higher)
7 (Strong Republican)
5 (Very
Conservative)
6 (Never)
12
2 (Female)
76
1 (white)
80 (Favor Trump)
60 (Favor Trump)
57 (Favor Trump)

Note: Respondents with missing responses to any variables were dropped.
For ease of interpretation, I reversed the order of this variable in the regression, such that higher indicated greater
worry.
63
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Table 2: Factors Predicting a Trump vs. Rubio Feeling Thermometer Gap

White
Age
Female
Family Income
Less Church Attend.
Ideology
Party ID
Education
Eco. Anxiety
State of Economy
Obama Approval
Resentment of black Americans
Muslims not violent
Oppose free trade
Oppose legal immigration
Not Worried about Latino Pres.

Model 1
All respondents
4.144
(2.751)
.172**
(.065)
-4.69**
(2.093)
-.224
(.329)
-.679
(.672)
-1.333
(1.378)
.631
(.892)
-.05
(.747)
.778**
(.368)
.391
(1.213)
1.116
(.913)
.55*
(.306)
-2.56***
(.945)
2.092***
(.677)
-.669
(.707)
-5.319***
(.892)

Model 2
Whites

Model 3
Whites

Model 4
Whites

.253***
(.076)
-3.808
(2.365)
-.267
(.367)
.095
(.771)
-1.47
(1.707)
1.048
(1.034)
.617
(.869)
.84*
(.434)
.599
(1.452)
.827
(1.094)
.425
(.355)
-3.302***
(1.101)
1.959***
(.778)
-.245
(.873)
-5.918***
(1.105)

.134
(.11)
-2.355
(3.52)
.03
(.651)
.019
(1.096)
-2.92
(2.794)
2.276
(1.669)
-.427
(1.37)
.314
(.686)
3.000
(2.215)
.259
(1.714)
.045
(.534)
-4.23**
(1.753)
2.248*
(1.169)
-.099
(1.314)

.392***
(.107)
-5.424*
(3.136)
-.467
(.422)
-.164
(1.12)
-.487
(2.135)
-.23
(1.278)
-.778
(1.1)
1.439***
(.552)
-1.107
(1.939)
1.439
(1.372)
.777*
(.464)
-1.953
(1.423)
1.339
(.984)
-.688
(1.202)

Latino Pres. Won’t favor immigrants

-5.603***
(1.725)

Latino Pres. Won’t favor L. America
American identity Unimportant
Constant
N
F-statistic
Robust Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Model 5
Repub.
7.551
(6.526)
.133
(.132)
-8.4**
(3.788)
-.82
(.512)
.889
(1.145)
-4.783
(2.924)
3.086
(2.514)
-1.813
(1.34)
.749
(.674)
1.198
(2.405)
-.461
(1.841)
1.516**
(.7)
-1.59
(1.631)
2.444*
(1.269)
.638
(1.171)
-8.075***
(1.513)

-.302
(.907)
.078
(9.296)
934

.466
(1.085)
4.887
(11.383)
704

.301
(1.719)
5.37
(15.368)
338

-7.395***
(1.487)
.776
(1.429)
7.811
(17.033)
366

12.12***

13.8***

6.38***

9.11***

.131
(2.196)
16.197
(22.76)
336
7.78***

Table 3: Factors Predicting a Trump vs. Cruz Feeling Thermometer Gap

White
Age
Female
Family Income
Less Church Attend.
Ideology
Party ID
Education
Eco. Anxiety
State of Economy
Obama Approval
Resentment of black Americans
Muslims not Violent
Oppose free trade
Oppose legal immigration
Not Worried about Latino Pres.

Model 1
All respondents
6.76**
(2.675)
.304***
(.063)
-2.488
(2.069)
.121
(.321)
.968
(.654)
-4.811***
(1.393)
1.324
(.85)
-.256
(.734)
.744**
(.365)
-.45
(1.235)
.129
(.876)
.53*
(.296)
-1.85**
(.94)
.636
(.653)
.955
(.726)
-3.425***
(.879)

Model 2
Whites

Model 3
Whites

Model 4
Whites

.39***
(.074)
-2.264
(2.347)
.166
(.371)
.507
(.733)
-6.479***
(1.718)
1.523
(1.052)
-1.07
(.869)
.886**
(.437)
-.294
(1.439)
.963
(1.069)
.403
(.341)
-1.947*
(1.116)
.653
(.752)
1.36
(.869)
-3.865***
(1.057)

.292***
(.112)
1.248
(3.464)
-.058
(.58)
-1.015
(1.1)
-8.4***
(2.641)
4.063**
(1.708)
-.875
(1.357)
.748
(.653)
1.922
(2.08)
-.82
(1.582)
.307
(.502)
-2.342
(1.71)
.851
(1.114)
1.469
(1.24)

.503***
(.098)
-5.273*
(3.138)
.34
(.445)
.593
(1.046)
-5.327**
(2.245)
-.872
(1.27)
-1.322
(1.105)
1.157*
(.608)
-1.575
(1.962)
2.583*
(1.327)
.584
(.465)
-1.103
(1.493)
.063
(1.025)
.933
(1.242)

Latino Pres. Won’t favor immigrants

-3.208*
(1.665)

Latino Pres. Won’t favor L. America

N

-.863
(.842)
-6.821
(9.109)
937

-1.335
(.984)
-1.671
(11.068)
707

-2.314**
(1.507)
-6.772
(15.236)
340

-5.315***
(1.42)
-.779
(1.342)
5.835
(15.229)
367

F-statistic

6.12***

6.74***

3.19***

5.56***

American identity unimportant
Constant

Robust Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Model 5
Repub.
10.497*
(6.119)
.445***
(.126)
-5.208
(3.669)
-.834*
(.461)
1.213
(1.049)
-10.613***
(2.718)
6.118***
(2.325)
-.797
(1.329)
.134
(.641)
-1.697
(2.217)
-2.778*
(1.656)
1.823***
(.63)
-.338
(1.57)
.81
(1.149)
2.366**
(1.184)
-5.576***
(1.462)

-2.475
(1.904)
-2.271
(23.248)
334
5.09***

Table 4: Factors Predicting a Trump vs. Jeb Bush Feeling Thermometer Gap

White
Age
Female
Family Income
Less Church Attend.
Ideology
Party ID
Education
Eco. Anxiety
State of Economy
Obama Approval
Resentment of black Americans
Muslims not violent
Oppose free trade
Oppose legal immigration
Not Worried about Latino Pres.

Model 1
All respondents
1.578
(2.784)
.188***
(.065)
-6.529***
(2.162)
.34
(.344)
1.509**
(.668)
.359
(1.395)
.866
(.914)
.566
(.737)
.653*
(.375)
1.816
(1.265)
2.084**
(.947)
1.309***
(.304)
-3.812***
(.942)
1.877***
(.686)
.121
(.728)
-4.145***
(.916)

Model 2
Whites

Model 3
Whites

Model 4
Whites

.219***
(.077)
-7.617***
(2.481)
.427
(.4)
1.087
(.781)
.236
(1.734)
.724
(1.132)
-.286
(.851)
.669
(.444)
2.121
(1.51)
2.186*
(1.168)
1.328***
(.354)
-4.678***
(1.123)
2.148***
(.784)
-.215
(.878)
-4.781***
(1.147)

.138
(.117)
-5.222
(3.711)
.588
(.617)
-.212
(1.108)
-1.692
(2.767)
3.72**
(1.761)
.014
(1.31)
.749
(.733)
6.792***
(2.206)
-.389
(1.726)
1.595***
(.529)
-4.568***
(1.698)
2.487**
(1.161)
-.093
(1.356)

.32***
(.101)
-9.371***
(3.278)
.298
(.477)
1.498
(1.137)
1.648
(2.145)
-1.851
(1.356)
-1.187
(1.076)
.62
(.56)
-1.01
(2.014)
4.198***
(1.449)
1.149**
(.466)
-4.498***
(1.57)
1.561
(1.02)
-.759
(1.16)

Latino Pres. Won’t favor immigrants

-4.994***
(1.751)

Latino Pres. Won’t favor L. America
American identity unimportant
Constant
N
F-statistic
Robust Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Model 5
Repub.
3.505
(6.964)
.145
(.129)
-17***
(3.903)
.131
(.557)
1.765
(1.095)
-.792
(2.846)
2.011
(2.541)
.404
(1.28)
.287
(.692)
5.321**
(2.509)
-1.443
(1.877)
3.365***
(.682)
-3.864**
(1.603)
3.406***
(1.28)
.048
(1.186)
-6.998***
(1.553)

1.272
(.888)
-16.48
(9.342)
933

2.155**
(1.025)
-8.224
(11.352)
710

3.384**
(1.687)
-21.867
(15.634)
340

-5.269***
(1.635)
1.41
(1.334)
6.876
(16.098)
370

23.21***

24.25***

13.94***

14.15***

.219
(2.041)
8.058
(21.843)
338
12.48***

